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W

HEN PETER TILLERS invited me to participate in this
festschrift for Mirjan Damaška, I proposed to write a short
concluding essay reviewing the articles in this volume and
drawing links between them. Perhaps I should have anticipated that this
would be no easy task, and maybe even have foreseen that it was an
assignment I would eventually shun. I should have known that there would
not be the six to eight articles I anticipated but the 17 that have been
submitted. Had I thought more, I would have realised that there would be
many people, myself included, who would seek both to honour Professor
Damaška and the opportunity to bask in his reflected glory. I certainly
should have realised that there would be no easy way to summarise
everything submitted, for Professor Damaška’s academic corpus is too
diverse and scholars’ views of even the same works are too different to
allow for any easy synthesis of contributions commenting on or inspired by
Damaška’s scholarship. Some see Professor Damaška as a leading comparativist, some admire him for his work on criminal procedure and some,
myself included, view Professor Damaška as an outstanding evidence
scholar, who has managed the all too rare accomplishment of bringing
truly new ideas to the study of evidence and procedure. Fortunately what
daunted me did not daunt John Jackson and Maximo Langer, for they
have, in their introduction, done a superb job of pulling together the
separate themes of this volume’s contributions, although I will point out
that not even they could unify the articles herein under a single theme.1

1

J Jackson, M Langer, ch 1.
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So if I am not to attempt a synthesis, what can I contribute? First, I
simply want to add to the chorus of admiration for Professor Damaška.
My admiration for him goes back to the first work of his I read, his
path-breaking book The Faces of Justice and State Authority. I had read
nothing like it before, nor, I might add, have I seen its equal since. It is one
of those rare works that allows one to see what are familiar issues, in this
case differences between Anglo-American and Continental legal systems, in
a new light. Once viewed in this light, matters are never the same. In
particular, by breaking down what had become fixed and sterile portraits
of adversarial and inquisitorial systems, Professor Damaška helped his
readers perceive and make sense of variations within and common features
across Anglo-American and Continental justice systems. He did so by
highlighting features that were either imperceptible or puzzling when
viewed from within the confines of the received adversarial-inquisitorial
dichotomy.
Professor Damaška first learned law abroad, and English is a second
language to him. His work on comparative evidentiary and procedural law
thus builds on certain (dare I say ‘unfair’) advantages Professor Damaška
has over most of us who labour in evidence law’s vineyards. He has a deep
knowledge of Continental legal systems and the contexts in which they
function, a level of knowledge to which few Americans even aspire. Also he
writes English far better than almost all who acquired the language at a
mother’s knee. The freshness of his insights is matched, and perhaps
enabled, by the freshness of his prose. For example:

Copyright © 2008. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. All rights reserved.

To consider forms of justice in monadic isolation from their social and economic
context is – for many purposes – like playing Hamlet without the Prince.2

and
Yet because [the opposing lawyer’s] accounts are contrary in nature, the initial
polarity created by the two evidentiary scenarios is preserved. Thus, as in a car
driving at night, two narrow beams continue to illuminate the world presented
to the adjudicator from the beginning until the end of trial.3

What American-born legal academic would, or could, write this way?
By receiving his initial legal training abroad, Professor Damaška avoided
the downside of being taught to ‘think like a lawyer’. Rather his thinking
has been shaped by what he has observed and not by any ends he has
aimed at. His is a Holmesean view of law, based on observation and
experience; not logic. One reason Professor Damaška’s insights are fresh is
that he makes no attempt to fit Continental and Anglo-American legal

2
M Damaška, The Faces of Justice and State Authority (New Haven, Yale University
Press, 1986) 7.
3
M Damaška, Evidence Law Adrift (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1997) 92.
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systems into any boxes other than those boxes into which they seem
empirically to fit best. Indeed, the Damaška who wrote Faces of Justice is
more of a sociologist than a lawyer. Only those who confuse empirical
analysis with quantitative data would not recognise this, for Faces of
Justice is empirical at its core. It tells a sociological story linking the
structure of legal procedure, and especially the trial, with the development
of political authority and the goals of states. The theses it advances are not
rigorously tested in accord with the canons of social science, but their
broad outline so well fits facts we think we know that it is easy to find
Professor Damaška’s narrative compelling.
I hesitate to tread the fields Professor Damaška has sown, for my
knowledge of comparative law and of European legal procedure pales next
to his, but the temptation to follow Professor Damaška’s example and
think sociologically about the structure of the Anglo-American and Continental legal systems is more than I wish to resist. Like Professor Damaška,
I shall construct, but cannot rigorously,test a sociological narrative of how
Anglo-American and Continental legal systems function, but my starting
point will be even further removed from the on the ground details of
Anglo-American and Continental legal systems than Professor Damaška’s
ideal types, and my approach will suggest even more room for contingency
in shaping the details of Anglo-American and Continental legal systems
than his does. Without any necessary inconsistency with Professor Damaška’s theorising, the perspective I shall offer will help explain why, as
Professor Damaška recognises, his ideal types break down and overlap in
practice. Also, the perspective I offer allows some speculation about how
legal systems might develop in an increasingly international and global
world.
To speak metaphorically, the Anglo American and Continental legal
systems are the marsupials and mammals of the legal world. Because
physical separation limited their competition with each other, marsupials in
Australia and mammals in most of the rest of the world long ago took
separate evolutionary paths. At the same time, despite local dominance,
neither reproductive form entirely excluded the other. Viewed in one way
marsupials and mammals are profoundly different; after all what is more
fundamental than the developmental stage at which the young enter the
world and the ways in which they are protected and nourished as they
grow to self-sufficiency. Moreover, some life forms are unique to each –
compare the kangaroo with any mammal of similar size, and remark on
the lack of marsupial elephants. Yet in other ways many marsupials native
to Australia are remarkably similar to mammals born elsewhere. Where
ecology made the same demands, or offered the same opportunities, for
survival, species that mirrored each other, like the marsupial thylacine and
the mammal wolf, developed. Despite fundamental differences in reproduction and some surface differences in appearance, where marsupials and
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mammals such as these filled the same ecological niche, they adapted in
similar ways and shared the phenotypical characteristics most necessary for
survival.4 In similar fashion Anglo-American and Continental modes of
trial and legal action have developed, or so I shall argue, to fill similar
niches. Despite obvious and in some ways deep differences in premises and
appearance, to the extent that similar demands have been placed on them,
Continental and Anglo-American legal systems have much of what matters
most in common.
Professor Damaška in Faces of Justice spotlights differences in Continental and legal systems engendered by differences in the social ecology and
histories of the states that spawned them. I shall focus on states more as
societies than as political actors and from this perspective point to
fundamental similarities in the Anglo-American and Continental systems,
with particular attention to how cases are decided. More speculatively, I
will question whether the association between state authority and ways of
trying cases trials that Professor Damaška Faces of Justice illuminates is a
necessary one. Perhaps Professor Damaška’s more centrally-driven Continental states could have functioned well with a judicial system that looked
much like the non-hierarchical conflict resolving Anglo-American
approach to trial justice, while the latter states could have coupled their
more diffuse vesting of political power with a more hierarchical policyoriented judiciary. Looking at existing practice one can only say that
Professor Damaška tells a powerful story about why the association he
posits is the more probable one. It is impossible to prove from the data at
hand whether the association is necessary rather than plausible or likely.
Indeed, I would not be surprised if a scholar as gifted as Professor
Damaška could tell an opposite but equally convincing story were the facts
on the ground reversed.
The perspective I shall write from is functionalism, an approach to
understanding society that is seen as outdated by many American sociologists, although it has greater currency on the Continent.5 It is also the
perspective most consistent with Professor Damaška’s approach to explanation in Faces of Justice. Functionalism is teleological in nature because it
seeks to explain social norms and structures by the ends they serve.6

4
Wikipedia explains: ‘An example of convergent evolution, the Thylacine showed many
similarities to the members of the Candidae (dog) family of the Northern Hemisphere: sharp
teeth, powerful jaws, raised heels and the same general body form. Since the Thylacine filled
the same ecological niche in Australia as the dog family did elsewhere, it developed many of
the same features. Despite this, it is unrelated to any of the Northern Hemisphere predators
— its closest living relative is the Tasmanian Devil (Sarcophilus harrisii).’ <http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Thylacine> accessed 19 June 2008.
5
See, eg, N Luhmann, Social Systems (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1995).
6
See A Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories (Chicago, University of Chicago Press,
1987) ch 3.
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Because it most often seeks to plausibly explain the status quo, functionalism is often regarded as a conservative approach to social analysis, but
functionalism is more properly seen as an analytic perspective that entails
no normative approval of the status quo, and a functional analysis need
not be conservative in its implications. Functionalism is also sometimes
regarded as circular, for the persistence of an institution is evidence that it
fills an important social function. There is more substance to this claim
than to the claim that functionalism is necessarily conservative, but this
does not mean the functional perspective is wrong, nor does it exclude the
positing and testing of hypotheses about the roles institutions play in
society and the implications of change or variation in institutions.
Functional theory is associated most prominently with the work of the
American sociologist Talcott Parsons.7 Parsons posited that there were four
basic functions that a society, and the core institutions within a society, had
to fill in order to survive. These were captured by the acronym AGIL,
which stands for adaptation, goal attainment, integration and latency or,
more commonly and more revealingly, pattern maintenance. At the societal
level the economy was the core adaptive institution, the polity was core to
goal attainment, cultural systems were fundamental to pattern maintenance and value systems, including especially legal institutions, were core
to integration. No institution is, however, exclusively concerned with its
associated core function. Economic, political and cultural systems also
contribute to societal integration just as legal institutions contribute to
adaptation, goal attainment and pattern maintenance.
What Parsons’ functional perspective implies for the current discussion is
that even if approaches to dispute processing on the Continent and in
Anglo-American systems appear different, they each must efficaciously
achieve similar ends relating to the binding of society together. To the
extent that Continental and Anglo-American states exist in similar environments and face similar challenges, their legal systems will have to solve
similar problems of social integration, and similarities in how they go
about doing this can be expected even if, like marsupials and mammals,
structural differences are apparent and in some ways fundamental. The
functional perspective also suggests that the role and characteristics of the
legal system will turn in part on the degree to which other institutional
sectors contribute to social integration because what is crucial is meeting
the systems’ functional needs and not the particular way these needs are
met. Thus, as Stewart Macaulay long ago showed, lawyers seldom play (or
played) a major role in resolving business disputes, and litigation between
businesses that deal regularly with each other is rare. This is because

7
For a general statement of Parson’s approach see T Parsons, The Social System
(Glencoe, Free Press, 1951).
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economic incentives motivate parties to preserve their relationship, while
litigation and its threat are likely to end it.8 Similarly the rule of law largely
disappears in some dictatorships because, for a time at least, brute force
and the threat of force can maintain social integration. It is the implications of this functional perspective for comparative legal analysis that I
wish to pursue here.
If the Continental and Anglo-American judicial systems play the same
functional role in their various societies, one can expect that despite visible
differences, there must be important respects, and perhaps the most
fundamentally important respects, in which they are similar. For starters,
as instruments of adjudication, courts are primarily concerned with resolving disputes in ways that will generally be regarded as legitimate. In
post-Enlightenment Western societies this means that disputes must be
resolved in accordance with pre-established legal norms by unbiased
decision makers who have rationally evaluated the evidence available to
them. In both the Anglo-American and Continental legal systems the
norms brought to bear on disputes are in principle known in advance. In
Continental systems this is obvious because the norms courts apply are
embodied in legal codes. In the Anglo-American world the situation has
seemed to some observers, particularly Continental observers, less clear, for
only some norms that courts apply are embodied in codes while others are
embedded in precedent. Moreover, Anglo-American systems assign key
law-applying tasks to the jury, which Continental scholars, at least since
Weber, have regarded as ‘irrational’, not in the sense of being crazy but in
the sense of not following consistent rules.9
The differences between the two systems on these dimensions are,
however, more apparent than real. In each system many fundamental
norms, particularly norms regarding matters treated by the criminal law,
track popular norms about right and wrong behaviour. In each system
other norms may be poorly publicised or ambiguous as applied to certain
facts, but they are not unknown or unknowable. Rather, professional legal
training is thought to allow those so trained to identify and interpret
relevant law through the investigation of codes, prior applications of the
norms and canonical commentaries, which tend to be treatises in the
Continental systems and high court pronouncements, including dicta, in
the Anglo-American legal world. Juries, at least in theory, do little to
change this situation, for they are not in the business of deciding what the
law means. Their task is rather to find facts and state the legal conclusion

8
S Macaulay, ‘Non-Contractual Relations and Business: A Preliminary Study’ (1963) 28
American Sociological Review 55–69.
9
M Weber, M Rheinstein (ed), On Law in Economy and Society, (Cambridge, Harvard
UP, 1954). See also A Kronman, Max Weber (Stanford, Stanford UP, 1983) and D Trubek,
‘Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism’ (1972) Wisconsin Law Review 720.
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these facts portend, given what they have been told about the law. While
juries can and do leaven the law’s commands with their sense of what is
moral or just, the evidence since Kalven and Zeisel’s path-breaking
research10 is that by and large juries take their legal role seriously and
seldom render decisions that are legally indefensible.
A second similarity, also closely tied to concerns for legitimacy, is that
both the Anglo-American and Continental systems are concerned with
judicial competence and unbiasedness. In the Anglo-American system
professional legal training, experience as a lawyer and modes of judicial
selection are seen as guarantors of judicial competence, while the common
sense of ordinary citizens and the virtues of group deliberation are
presumed to make juries capable of rationally judging the facts before
them. In Continental systems, judicial competence is guaranteed by
extended professional training designed explicitly to produce judges, by the
structure of judging as a professional career and by multi-judge and mixed
professional/lay judge courts, especially in important cases. Unbiasedness is
guaranteed in the American system by norms that separate the judiciary
from the ‘political’ branches of government, by rules for judicial recusal
and by allowing litigants to vet jurors and challenge those whose neutrality
seems questionable. In the Continental system, making judging a career
track separate from prosecution and private lawyering, together with
professional judicial training, is thought to promote judicial neutrality
along with competence.
In neither system need the assumptions of competent and impartial
judging always hold. From a functional standpoint all that matters is that
people ordinarily believe they do. If people believe courts are fair and
competent, the judicial resolution of disputes will be presumed legitimate,
allowing courts and the law to play the integrative role that state and
society require.
A third element essential to the legitimacy of court verdicts and hence to
the likelihood that legal institutions will fill their integrative function is the
requirement that court decisions be based on the rational evaluation of
reliable evidence. This too is a demand placed on both Anglo-American
and Continental legal systems, but ideas about what evidence is reliable
and what it means to evaluate evidence rationally may vary with location
and over time. For example, in England before 1215 belief in the reality of
divine intervention made trial by ordeal and trial by battle apparently

10
H Kalven Jr and H Zeisel, The American Jury (Chicago, Univ of Chicago Press, 1966).
Although the Kalven and Zeisel study was done some years ago, its results have held up well
over time. See, eg, N Vidmar and V Hans, ‘The American Jury at Twenty-Five Years’ (1991)
16 Law & Social Inquiry 323; see also T Eisenberg et al, ‘Judge–Jury Agreement in Criminal
Cases: A Partial Replication of Kalven and Zeisel’s The American Jury’ (2005) 2 Journal of
Empirical Legal Studies 171.
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rational ways of determining guilt and deciding legal disputes. After 1215,
however, when decrees of the Fourth Lateran Council barred priests from
giving ritual blessings as preludes to common ordeals and trial by battle,
these modes of resolving disputes fell out of favour in England, although
trial by ordeal had surprising persistence on the Continent. The two
systems also differed in the weight they were willing to give confessions
obtained through torture and hence in their use of torture to secure
confessions.
Post-Enlightenment, there has been considerable convergence about
what it means to decide a legal claim rationally and, I would argue, for a
long while there has been no great difference between Continental and
Anglo-American systems on this score. Both systems presume there is a
true state of affairs that can be best determined by first collecting reliable
evidence that bears on the existence of whatever state legal norms
problematise, and then dispassionately evaluating that evidence in light of
what is known about how people act and how the world works. The
systems do, however, differ somewhat in their judgments of the relative
reliability of kinds of evidence, and they differ even more in the processes
that they see as most conducive to the marshalling and rational evaluation
of evidence.
Hearsay is the iconic example of how systems can differ in their
judgment of what evidence is reliable. Hearsay is presumed barred in
Anglo-American systems and allowed on the Continent. In practice,
however, differences in the treatment of hearsay are not that great.
Anglo-American evidence law has proliferated exceptions that admit
hearsay, and even where exceptions do not neatly fit statements offered,
trial courts will often find some way to admit hearsay that judges think
reliable. Continental systems, on the other hand, often treat hearsay with
suspicion, discounting it when it is not corroborated by other evidence,
and in one Continental system, Italy, theoretical barriers to admitting
hearsay appear similar to what they are in the United States and England.
This convergence is not surprising, for there is little reason to believe that
hearsay is, in fact, more or less probative depending on whether it is
gathered in England, in the United States or on the Continent, nor is there
reason to believe that experience with hearsay will lead Anglo-American
and Continental thinkers to differ substantially in their views of the
probative force of particular pieces of hearsay evidence. If the probative
value of a hearsay statement is likely to seem similar to Continental and
Anglo-American observers, the functional perspective suggests that there
will be considerable on-the-ground similarity in how that statement is
treated despite different traditions. Giving weight to apparently reliable
hearsay and discounting or refusing to consider unreliable hearsay is
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impelled by a common rationalist commitment to the evaluation of reliable
evidence and by the relationship of this commitment to the legitimacy of
judicial verdicts.
When we move beyond issues of fundamental fairness and basic epistemological requirements for rationally evaluating evidence to the procedures that are most likely to promote the fair and rational evaluation of
evidence, there is considerable room for historically (that is, path dependent) and culturally rooted differences in how Anglo-American and Continental systems gather and present evidence and adjudicate cases. This is
possible because there is ‘more than one way to skin a cat’. A variety of
different approaches to adjudication may yield results that are in the
aggregate sufficiently fair and rational to be accepted by parties and
observers and hence to allow legal institutions to play the integrative role
that Parsonian systems theory demands. Partisans of one system or the
other may present reasoned arguments why their favoured approach to
adjudication should be preferred, but to date no one to my knowledge has
ever shown empirically that one system produces more accurate verdicts
than the other, is less likely to convict the innocent or favour more
powerful parties or is more likely to yield verdicts that meet with
widespread popular resistance. Indeed, it is the absence of empirical
evidence that allows disputes between partisans of the Anglo-American
and Continental systems to flourish.
Most commentaries on comparative procedure, including Faces of
Justice, focus not on the system-level contributions that legal institutions
make to social integration but rather on differences in the rules and
behavior that govern court cases. These differences appear stark. The
Anglo-American system in its purest form believes that a group of unbiased
lay people (that is, a jury) exposed to the evidence and arguments that
opposing parties think most support their positions is the best means of
determining where truth in litigation lies. It also believes that with proper
instructions the jury can state the legal implications of the facts they have
found.11 The Continental system in its purest form has treated the truth as
unitary and proceeds on the assumption that the judicial discovery of the
truth best proceeds in a unitary fashion. Thus the iconic figure in
Continental jurisprudence is the investigating judge who himself seeks out
evidence and follows it, wherever it leads, to discern the truth.

11
The belief that juries exposed to conflicting stories can find facts accurately enjoys
considerable research support, but faith in the jury’s ability to understand the meaning of
instructions and to correctly apply the law, as explained in the instructions, to the facts at
hand rests on shakier ground. For a synthetic overview of the jury’s strengths and weaknesses
in finding facts and applying the law see N Vidmar and VP Hans, American Juries: The
Verdict (Amherst, Prometheus Press, 2007) ch 7.
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The usual practice on the Continent is different. In criminal cases, an
investigating agency, analogous to the police/prosecution pairing in AngloAmerican systems, prepares a dossier setting forth the facts uncovered. The
court then uses this dossier, perhaps supplemented by testimony from and
questioning of the accused, a complainant and expert or other witnesses, to
decide the case. On the civil side yet more is left to the parties. Unlike the
Anglo-American system, where the jury has long been a favourite research
subject, there has been little empirical scholarship on the ability of
Continental courts to reach fair and accurate trial decisions.12 What little
research exists focuses mainly on whether lay judges in mixed court
systems have substantial independent influence on the cases in which they
sit. The answer with respect to verdicts has been a resounding ‘no’,
although some work has suggested that lay judges may have more of an
influence on sentencing decisions than they do on verdicts reached.13
Another iconic difference between the Anglo-American and Continental
systems is that trial courts on the Continent give reasons for their decisions
while Anglo-American courts do not do so when trial is to a jury. In
discussing the relative merits of the two systems with Continental scholars
and their Anglo-American sympathisers, this difference is often presented
to me as trump by those who assert the superiority of Continental-style
adjudication by professional judges. Indeed, many Continental observers

12
This is my impression, but I have not searched the foreign literature, and there may be
research on the fairness and accuracy of professional judges I do not know about. Machura
touches on this issue in a survey of lay assessors in two German cities: see S Machura,
‘Interaction Between Lay Assessors and Professional Judges in German Mixed Courts’ (2001)
72 International Review of Penal Law 451. He reports that 84% of the lay assessors he
interviewed in one city and 79% of those he interviewed in the other thought that the verdicts
in the cases they sat on were either ‘very’ or ‘quite’ just. I would not give too much weight to
survey data of this sort in assessing the competence of professional judge or mixed tribunals.
13
The first study published in English to document this that I know of is G Casper and H
Zeisel, ‘Lay Judges in the German Criminal Courts’ (1972) 1 The Journal of Legal Studies
146–191. Their finding that lay judges on mixed courts almost always have the same verdict
preferences as the professional judge or judges has been replicated by a number of other
scholars. Indeed, in some courts the lay judges are known as ‘nodders’ because they seem to
do little more than nod their heads in agreement with the professional judge or judges. A
recent study based on a survey of lay judges who sat in lower criminal courts in two German
cities by the sociologist Stefan Machura presents a more nuanced view of the situation but the
study does not seem to differ greatly from the received knowledge in its bottom line: see Ibid.
Machura documents various structural reasons that serve to limit the influence of lay judges,
such as their ignorance of the case before it begins and the ability of the professional judge to
negotiate what Americans would call ‘plea bargains’ without consulting their lay counterparts. He also notes the large degree of agreement between lay and professional judges, but in
doing so he cites survey responses that indicate that lay judges feel they have had some
influence on proceedings by influencing the professional judge’s views. He notes, however,
that the influences his lay respondents report may be slight and that professional judges prefer
informal proceedings to formal voting. Keeping things informal help a professional judge
keep control of the deliberations, making it difficult to know when lay judges have influenced
proceeding and, in particular, whether their presence resulted in a verdict different from that
which the professional judge or judges sitting alone would have reached.
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find it hard to imagine a modern legal system that can pronounce verdicts
without giving reasons. The difference seems to me, however, to be
overdrawn. First, jury decision-making is not necessarily antithetical to
reason-giving. Even though the Anglo-American jury does not provide
reasons for its decisions, some countries that have adopted jury systems
have required their juries to give reasons,14 and in the United States the use
of special verdict forms that specifically probe the facts the jury found is
not uncommon, especially in civil cases. Second, and more importantly,
reasons for jury verdicts are often transparent if one cares to look. The jury
are told that they can only find for the moving party (plaintiff or
prosecution) when certain facts hold. When a verdict is for the moving
party, the reason is obvious: The jury believed all the facts necessary for the
plaintiff or prosecution to prevail. If, for example, conflicting testimony
was given on a crucial point, then the jury must have believed the
testimony of the party that had to prove the point to win. Matters are less
transparent when verdicts are for defendants, but at least we know that
some facts essential to the plaintiff’s or prosecution’s case were not shown
to the requisite degree of proof.
It may be objected that a jury may not have actually found crucial facts
in the way their verdict implies, and that if they gave reasons for their
verdicts, as judges do on the Continent and in bench trials in the United
States, this would be known. The comparison here, however, assumes that
judges’ reasons accurately reflect how they assessed the evidence and what
motivated their decisions. Judges are smart people, familiar with the law.
They know what reasons will support a verdict and which will not. Hence,
whatever a judge thought of the evidence and whatever motivated a
decision, a judge is unlikely to craft an opinion that rests the verdict on an
unsupportable ground. Indeed, reason-giving is open to abuse. I recall one
conversation with a European judge who told me that on the rare
occasions where his opinion did not prevail on a mixed court, he might
write an opinion that would lead the appellate court to reverse the decision
that he was, in theory, advocating.15 Jurors, of course, do not have
professional legal knowledge, and if they had to specify the reasons for
their verdicts, they might well offer unacceptable justifications, sometimes
because their reasons were in fact unacceptable and sometimes because

14
SC Thaman, ‘Europe’s New Jury Systems: The Cases of Span and Russia’ (Spring 1999)
62 Law and Contemporary Problems 233. Austria, like Spain, requires its juries to give
reasons for their verdicts.
15
Even when the lay judges’ views have prevailed over that of the professional judge on a
mixed court the task of laying out the reasons for the verdict is typically assigned to the
professional judge. Because mixed courts often strive to reach an informal consensus rather
than bring matters to votes, it may be that the lay judges will not realise they have not
persuaded the professional judge to their views, so they will not suspect that a judge might try
to subvert their verdict through the opinion he writes.
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they did not know how to convey clearly what motivated them.16 The fact
that we do not learn when a jury has relied on unacceptable reasons does
not mean that juries are less faithful to the law than a judge who might
reach a verdict unsupported by the facts or law, but who knows enough to
disguise this in an opinion.
The requirement that Continental courts provide reasons does, however,
have an important functional implication. Together with the dossier that
accompanies the case, written reasons allow an appellate court to overturn
a verdict below by rejecting the trial court’s reasons and substituting its
own judgment. In this sense the Continental system serves well the
hierarchical bureaucratic state that Damaška describes in The Faces of
Justice. But hierarchical control is not something that only Continental
governments want or need. Any modern state seeks significant control
from the top. Anglo-American courts too have means that allow higher
courts to supervise the verdicts of trial courts and ensure that trial court
verdicts are acceptable. They can use the rules of evidence to this end.
Almost every trial contains some evidentiary error, for shortcuts are often
taken in the presentation of evidence, and admissibility decisions are often
based on rules of thumb rather than on a close technical analysis of what is
and is not admissible. The upshot is that when an appellate court wishes to
overturn a verdict below, it can invariably find some justification. Conversely when a higher court does not wish to disturb a verdict, it can ignore
evidentiary error or recognise error but find it harmless.
From a functional standpoint it would appear to be no accident that
rules of evidence began to arise in England at about the time that other,
more direct means of jury control, such as actions of attaint brought
against jurors who did not decide as the Crown through its judges wished,
were disappearing. No state can afford to trust decisions about the exercise
of its coercive power entirely to the masses, and although the jurors who
were eligible to sit on cases in the 17th, 18th and early 19th centuries were
by no means ‘the masses’, they were an element beyond direct hierarchical
control.17
Overturning verdicts for evidentiary error is, to be sure, a clumsier way
of exercising hierarchical control than the substitution of judgment which
the review of a case dossier in light of a trial court’s reasons allows. What
makes it inefficient is that the standard remedy for evidentiary error is to
remand the case for a trial in which the error will be corrected, and there is
no guarantee that a verdict an appellate court wished to reject will be

16
We see something like this when jurors are given verdict forms that require them to
respond to specific questions. Occasionally the answers they give are inconsistent or do not
support the verdict they render.
17
See, eg, Bushell’s Case (1670) 1 Freem 1, and Vaughan 135.
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different because an evidentiary error is avoided on retrial.18 At least in the
United States, however, appellate courts are becoming more adept in
substituting judgment even when they are reversing for evidentiary error,
most commonly in cases involving scientific evidence where they opine that
without the evidence they have found wrongfully admitted, the party
proffering the evidence has no case. Moreover, even when an appellate
court does not mandate a result, remanding for evidentiary error may
predictably result in a party’s decision not to pursue the case further or
may stimulate a compromise verdict that the appellate court would have
found acceptable.
In the United States, however, there is an important exception to the
power that appellate courts gain through their ability to reverse for
evidentiary error. When an accused criminal is acquitted, he cannot be
tried again on the same charge even if the acquittal would not have
occurred but for a trial judge’s error in admitting or excluding evidence. It
might seem that criminal cases are where hierarchical control would most
matter to those with state power. This may well be true, but juries have
seldom posed substantial obstacles to the exercise of hierarchical control.
Most criminal charges have no implications beyond their outcomes, and
where charged crimes have a political dimension convictions are often easy
to come by because jurors ordinarily share the views and prejudices of the
authorities who have ordered the prosecution. Acquittals are most likely in
situations where substantial public sentiment, although not necessarily
majority sentiment, favours the accused. Acquittals in these cases may,
ironically, do more to defuse tensions and allow the peaceful maintenance
of state authority than would follow from the convictions the state seeks.
In a less democratic society matters might be different, for in such states
legitimacy may play a lesser role than minimally disguised power in
maintaining the government.
Lest I be misunderstood, let me make state clearly that the fact that
appellate courts can exercise hierarchical control by reversing trial verdicts
for evidentiary error does not mean that the Anglo-American and Continental systems are equally effective in enabling hierarchical control. Thus, I
am not disagreeing fundamentally with Professor Damaška’s analysis.
Rather, my point is that even if law’s contribution to social integration is
functionally necessary, a social system can persist with contributions
toward this end that fall considerably short of perfection. The degree to
18
Thus, the United States Supreme Court twice reversed verdicts for Sallie Hillmon in her
famous law suit against the Mutual Life Insurance Company, apparently feeling that she was
engaged in insurance fraud and that a jury had mistakenly believed her story. But Ms Hillmon
eventually received most of what she claimed due. For a fascinating account of this case, and
a suggestion that it was the Supreme Court rather than two juries that was mistaken on the
facts, see M Wesson, ‘The Hillmon Case, the Supreme Court and the McGuffin’ in R Lempert
(ed), Evidence Stories (New York, Foundation Press, 2006) 277–305.
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which institutional arrangements facilitate particular outcomes may, however, tell us something about how important that outcome is to the system
in question. A strong jury system is, for example, not necessary to
democratic government just as it is not incompatible with considerable
hierarchical control, but at some point system demands may mean that
jury justice cannot be tolerated. A likely example is post-Communist
Russia. Jury trial was an early and popular reform as Russia moved toward
democracy. But allocating real power to juries became less tolerable as the
Russian state under Putin became a far more hierarchically directed and
authoritarian regime. Thus it is not surprising that since Putin’s advent,
jury justice has been largely gutted, and in any case where central
authorities seek to achieve certain results, they can do so regardless of what
a jury might decide at trial.19
A third important difference between the Anglo-American and Continental legal systems is the difference between entrusting evidence gathering
to an investigating judge or an agency charged with reporting all the
relevant evidence it finds (whichever way it cuts) and leaving the gathering
and presentation of evidence to adversarial parties. Both systems arguably
respond to the same functional requisite: that the collection and presentation of evidence be handled in a way that seems fair and allows for rational
judgments based on reliable facts. Seen in this light, the difference between
the systems appears small, for each allows considerable evidence to be
amassed for presentation to the court. The Continental system not only
entrusts evidence gathering to a person or agency that is nominally neutral,
but it also provides ways for the parties to add to or influence the
information included in the dossier and to add to that evidence in court
proceedings. The Anglo-American system20 is seemingly different, for
evidence gathering is entrusted to the parties and they are, with rare
exceptions, expected to assemble and present only that information that
helps their cases. But the situation on the ground is not the private
knowledge situation that exists in theory. Parties commonly agree to or are
required to share considerable information. In civil cases by the time a case
reaches trial a party through discovery will know the opposing party’s legal
theories and almost all the evidence that will be offered to support them.
Defendants in criminal cases know specifically what they are charged with,

19
Compare Thaman, above n 12, with SC Thaman, ‘The Nullification of the Russian
Jury: Lessons for Jury-Inspired Reform in Eurasia and Beyond’ (2007) 40 Cornell International Law Journal 355. See also Stephen C Thaman, ch 6.
20
I know far less about what occurs in Britain and her former colonies than I do about
how matters proceed in the United States, so what I write below may be truer of the American
legal system than of Anglo-American systems in general.
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and through preliminary hearing testimony, the receipt of Brady material,21
their own contact with the state’s witnesses and informal information
sharing with the prosecution often begin trial with considerable knowledge
of the case the state will present. At one time, the prosecution had no
reciprocal access to the defendant’s evidence or planned trial strategy, but
increasingly the defendant must reveal information in order to acquire
information in the state’s possession, and defences most likely to surprise
the state or to require advance preparation to counter, like alibi defences or
the insanity defence, often must be noticed in advance of trial.
State authority would most likely be undercut if too many criminal
defendants were acquitted, for this would cast doubt on the fairness and
effectiveness of a state’s social control mechanisms and suggest a state was
not adequately protecting its inhabitants. But both Anglo-American and
Continental systems have mechanisms to ensure that too many acquittals
do not happen. Most important is the resource advantage the state enjoys
over all but the wealthiest criminal defendants. Thus in both AngloAmerican systems and on the Continent criminal cases are typically
characterised by such an imbalance of evidence that defendants are
persuaded either to plead guilty or, if guilty pleas are technically unavailable, to refrain from mounting substantial defences. Foregoing a meaningful defence is not necessarily bad, for a meaningful defence may not be
available. The state’s evidence is presumably overwhelming because the
defendant is overwhelmingly likely to be guilty.
We can, however, ask whether this presumption necessarily holds.
Recent studies in the United States have indicated that in a troublesome
proportion of cases where defendants were convicted of rape or murder,
which are the most seriously punished ordinary crimes, the defendants
were in fact innocent when they stood trial.22 It would not be surprising if
false conviction rates were similar in England and on the Continent.23

21
Brady material is significant exculpatory material that the state uncovers in its
investigation which it is required to turn over to the accused. Brady v Maryland (1963) 373
US 83.
22
HA Bedau and ML Radelet, ‘Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases’ (1987)
40 Stanford Law Review 21; SR Gross, K Jacoby, DJ Matheson, N Montgomery and S Patil,
‘Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003’ (2005) 95 Northwestern Law Review
529–533; MD Risinger, ‘Convicting the Innocent: An Empirically Justified Wrongful Conviction Rate’ (16 September 2006), available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=931454>
accessed 19 June 2008; SR Gross and B O’Brien, ‘Frequency and Predictors of False
Conviction: The Problem, and Some Data on Capital Cases’ unpublished manuscript on file
with the author [2007]. Estimates of the proportion wrongfully convicted range from about
to 2% to about 5%.
23
Anecdotally, support for juries in Japan and the country’s eventual move to mixed
courts was stimulated by two cases in which defendants sentenced to death were later proven
innocent. There is similar anecdotal evidence of wrongful convictions in Great Britain, but I
know no systematic attempts to identify the wrongfully convicted in either country or in any
other country in Europe.
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The kinds of misleading evidence that in the United States result in
wrongful convictions, such as mistaken eye witness identifications, faulty
forensic science and psychologically coerced confessions, are also likely to
play an important role in English and European trials. Other structural
problems also conduce to error by diminishing the likelihood that faulty
evidence will be refuted. Criminal defence counsel in the United States are
often over-worked, under-compensated or simply incompetent; funds for
experts to check the state’s forensic science evidence are limited if they exist
at all; and once the police or prosecution decide to arrest a person they
have strong professional incentives to make the arrest stick. I don’t know
of research that documents similar shortcomings in Continental justice
systems, but I would not be surprised if similar systemic biases and
deficiencies exist. I say this not just because psychological and organisational limitations are not bounded by the Atlantic Ocean but also because
criminal justice systems lose legitimacy when they do not solve crimes and
secure the convictions of those who are officially claimed to have ‘done it’.
My thesis to this point is that if we focus not on how Anglo-American
and Continental legal systems ideally go about their judicial business but
on the relationship between legal systems and social integration, we see
that the two systems face similar challenges and in large measure operate
under similar post-Enlightenment constraints. Although the systems have
devised somewhat different mechanisms for meeting those challenges, like
the thylacine and the wolf they have evolved to do much the same thing.
Seen in this light, Professor Damaška’s observation that the pure systems of
his ideal types are nowhere to be found is expected rather than remarkable.
There is no reason why bench trials should not be common in the United
States and Britain or why some judges should not ask their own questions
of witnesses, or freely admit hearsay evidence or appoint court experts.
Similarly no functional necessity precludes Continental systems from giving
parties a role in developing evidence, using juries in some cases or
regarding hearsay with such suspicion that it is ignored entirely.
The Anglo-American and Continental systems are not pure manifestations of the ideal types Professor Damaška gives us24 because they don’t
have to be. What they do have to be are generally acceptable ways of
deciding cases, which in today’s world means they should be based on the
apparently rationale and unbiased evaluation of reliable evidence. So long
as these requisites are met, judicial dispute resolution will contribute to
social integration.25 Nothing about the functional role of courts means
there is only one way they can fill their function.

24

This is a fact Damaška not only recognises but highlights.
I have in this chapter focused on courts and how their adjudicative activities contribute
to social integration. This is by no means the only way in which legal institutions play an
integrative role in society. Contract law, for example, is crucial to economic coordination.
25
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Given this functional leeway, it is not surprising that within both the
Anglo-American and Continental legal worlds, systems of evidence gathering and adjudication have evolved differently and that what seems to be a
unitary Continental or Anglo-American tradition when viewed from afar
has long dissolved into a set of country or even locality-specific practices
when viewed close up. One need only compare Dutch, French, Italian and
German legal proceedings now or even 50 years ago to appreciate this. Nor
is it surprising that within systems differentiation is ongoing. Italy’s
adoption of a hearsay rule similar to that of the United States is a
Continental example of divergent evolution within a tradition while Great
Britain’s abolition of once available jury trial rights in cases where they
remain available in the United States is a similar example on the AngloAmerican side.
Moreover, I expect that the breakdown of the Continental and AngloAmerican ideal types will only accelerate. Increased international interchange promotes borrowing across traditions, for such interchange means
that legal elites develop a better appreciation of alternative ways of case
processing and that ordinary people, through the media, travel and other
sources, find that what was once an entirely alien approach to legal action
has some familiarity. Taking an evolutionary perspective, I would expect
borrowing across traditions to be most likely where aspects of the
Continental or Anglo-American tradition seem functionally superior to
received ways of doing things. A Continental example of such borrowing
may be the increased role for defence counsel in questioning the state’s
evidence and ensuring that evidence favourable to the defendant is part of
the case record. An Anglo-American example is the increased responsibility
placed on trial judges to monitor the quality of scientific evidence and an
apparent increase in the willingness of judges to appoint neutral court
experts. Both examples of borrowed procedure are thought to make for
fairer, more accurate verdicts. In this respect, they strengthen the law’s
capacity to resolve disputes legitimately, which in turn makes the law a
more effective agent of social integration.
Globalisation poses special problems for the law as an instrument of
integration. Not only do legal norms and cultures compete for authority on
the world stage, but also no nation is committed to an integrated global
system of government. Yet there is enough global interchange and there are
enough situations where countries, organisations and even people must
cooperate cross-nationally that some degree of social integration at the
global level is necessary for everyone’s well-being. If the legal sphere is,
from a functional standpoint, the lead institution in promoting social
integration at the national and subnational levels, can it play a similar role
in global society? Or to put the point more strongly, can we build a
globalised society without legal institutions that promote its integration?
The Parsonian theory I have built this discussion on would say ‘no’.
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This problem is not an abstract one, but is faced every day in those
spheres where globalisation is most advanced and where close ties across
national borders add the most value. Perhaps the best example is multinational commerce. Those engaged in multi-national commerce cannot
escape entirely the legal regimes of those countries in which they do
business, which means they cannot escape inconsistency in the laws by
which they are regulated.26 However, it seems safe to say that most
organisations that do business internationally would prefer regulation
under a single legal regime, one that employs similar regulatory and
dispute resolution procedures no matter where disagreements arise. Without a world government in place, the functional imperative of integration
has led the most active players in the world trade system to try to establish
their own legal system. In some measure they have been able to do so
through the establishment of a regime of international arbitration27 that
can yield judgments binding under different countries’ domestic laws.
Commercial forces have also influenced and taken advantage of international treaties, which sometimes establish their own special tribunals. Even
when tribunals are not established, treaty law is often binding on and
enforceable by court judgments within nations.
What is happening internationally replicates what happened domestically in England and on the Continent centuries ago. Merchants of various
sorts as well as labour guilds established their own laws and courts to deal
with disputes within their ranks. As national legal systems developed,
much of the business of these courts was taken over by national court
systems and the norms they enforced were incorporated into official law or
replaced by it.28 Whether something like this will happen on a global
sphere is a question I have no way of answering. A related question is what
procedures will best serve the function of societal integration at the global
level. Arbitration procedure suggests that the procedures that emerge will
be a blend of Continental and Anglo-American traditions. One the one
hand, rules of evidence are relaxed in arbitration and there is no jury. On
the other hand, arbitrators are passive judges and the parties are responsible for developing their cases. Reason giving, which is sometimes seen as
the most important distinction between Anglo-American jury trials and
Continental judge or mixed-court systems, is sometimes expected in

26
Witness Microsoft’s antitrust difficulties in the United States and the EU and the
different resolutions it has had to accede to.
27
See, e.g., Y Dezalay and B Garth, Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial
Arbitration & the Construction of a Transnational Order (Chicago, University of Chicago
Press, 1997).
28
Merchants’ courts have not entirely disappeared. See, eg, L Bernstein, ‘Merchant Law in
a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent Business Norms’ (1996) 144
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1765.
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arbitration proceedings and sometimes forbidden. So if we look to arbitration for a clue as to the procedures that are functionally best suited to
promoting social integration, supporters of both the Anglo-American and
Continental systems can point to ways in which the procedures they
espouse are superior. But it may be a mistake to look to arbitration,
international or otherwise, for such a clue. At the core of Professor
Damaška’s book is a set of arguments that associates ways that legal
systems handle cases with the structures and goals of types of governments.
The legal forms that might best promote the integration of a mature
globalised state are likely to depend on how that state is organised, which
from today’s vantage point is unknowable.
Professor Damaška’s great book, The Faces of Justice and State Authority, opened its readers’ eyes to how Anglo-American and Continental legal
procedures articulate with the societies in which they are found, and it
alerted readers to issues that arise in considering this articulation. I have
tried to examine the connections of procedural law and society at a yet
more abstract level. I have not written a great book, just a short chapter. It
is highly speculative, and I do not know if it succeeds as a work of theory.
But I do hope it succeeds in its primary purpose, as a tribute to Professor
Mirjan Damaška.
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